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 Chapter Three 
Employment Protection and 
Misallocation of Resources across Plants: 
International Evidence* 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Although the effect of employment protection on aggregate productivity is 
getting increasing attention (Bassanini et al., 2009), establishing the 
relationship between the two is difficult for many reasons. An important 
challenge stems from the fact that employment protection affects aggregate 
productivity via two different channels that are potentially contradicting. 
Firstly, employment protection affects technological change and technical 
efficiency by influencing the incentive of the firm to invest in new technologies 
and on the motivation of workers to learn new production techniques. The 
relationship in this regard is unclear since both theoretical and empirical 
evidence shows that the effect of employment protection on innovation and 
                                                          
* The research in this chapter has been resubmitted to CESifo Economic Studies journal 
after a revise and resubmit decision.  
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worker motivation is ambiguous1. Secondly, employment protection induces 
misallocation by distorting the process of labor reallocation across plants, 
ultimately reducing aggregate productivity. The majority of existing studies 
do not distinguish between these two separate effects since they rely on 
aggregate productivity data.    
This study focuses exclusively on the effects of employment protection on 
resource misallocation across plants. An emerging literature, recently 
reviewed by Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) in a special release of the Review of 
Economic Dynamics, asserts that misallocation of factors of production 
substantially reduces aggregate productivity. An influential paper by Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009) documents the presence of significant within-industry 
dispersions in the marginal products of labor and capital in China and India. 
This dispersion is relatively lower in the US, implying that distorting policies 
and institutions in China and India induce resource misallocation across 
plants. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) use a growth model to show that 
misallocation of resources across heterogeneous plants can substantially lower 
aggregate productivity. These and other recent studies (Alfaro et al.,  2009; 
Bartelsman et al., 2013; Kamal and Lovely, 2012) underscore the need to 
understand the sources of resource misallocation across plants is order to 
explain productivity differences across industries and countries.   
                                                          
1 Belot et al. (2002) argue for a positive effect of employment protection on worker 
motivation whereas Ichino and Riphahn (2005) provide evidence to the contrary. The 
evidence regarding innovation is similarly mixed. Bartelsman et al. (2010) suggest 
that employment protection could discourage firms from investing on high-risk 
technologies and Saint-Paul (2002) also shows that countries with rigid labor 
regulation will specialize in non-innovative products. On the other hand, Koeniger 
(2005) argues that high dismissal cost pushes incumbents to innovate and increase 
productivity in the short run in order to avoid costly labor adjustments.  








Theoretical models show that employment protection can induce resource 
misallocation by reducing the ability of firms to adjust their labor in response 
to demand and technological shocks. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show 
that, by creating a wedge between the marginal product and marginal cost of 
labor, dismissal cost reduces employment and lowers labor productivity. 
Lagos (2006) similarly demonstrates how higher dismissal cost can reduce 
aggregate productivity2. Several empirical studies also document the negative 
effect of employment protection on job flows and worker reallocation 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2008; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Micco and Pagés, 2006; Martin 
and Scarpetta, 2012). 
In spite of the clear theoretical prediction, there is limited empirical 
evidence on the effect of employment protection on resource misallocation 
across plants. The main contribution of our analysis is providing the first 
empirical evidence on the effect of employment protection on resource 
misallocation across plants in several countries3. Misallocation is measured 
                                                          
2 Some theoretical studies look into the interactions between employment protection 
and other institutions. Kambourov (2009) uses a general equilibrium model to show 
how employment protection slows down the inter-sectoral reallocation of labor after 
a trade reform. Boedo and Mukoyama (2012) show that differences in dismissal cost 
and entry restrictions are important in explaining cross-country differences in 
aggregate productivity. Poschke (2009) studies how employment protection lowers 
productivity by reducing labor reallocation and firm exit. Garicano et al. (2012) find 
that size contingent employment protection lowers output in France. 
3 Using aggregated, industry-level data for several countries, Caballero et al. (2013) 
find that employment protection leads to greater deviations from optimal labor use. 
However, their measure of deviation from optimal employment is not specifically 
related to misallocation across plants, and does not have a clear link with aggregate 
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using the dispersion (standard deviation and interquartile range) of the 
marginal product of labor and total factor revenue productivity across plants 
within an industry. Theoretical studies have indicated that the dispersion of 
marginal products and productivity can be used as summary measures for the 
level of misallocation across plants (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Greater 
dispersion of productivity and marginal products in an industry implies 
substantial unrealized gain in aggregate productivity caused by the failure to 
reallocate resources from less productive to more productive firms (Ito and 
Lechevalier 2009; Syversson, 2004).    
The analysis in this study is based on data from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys (WBES) dataset, which provides detailed plant-level data 
for several countries that is collected using standardized survey instruments. 
The dataset used for analysis in this study covers close to 30,000 
manufacturing plants in 91 countries. The industry-level measures of 
dispersion that are computed from the plant-level WBES dataset are then 
combined with country-level dismissal cost data from the World Bank’s 
Employing Workers dataset, which is also extensive in its country coverage. 
Dismissal cost is measured in standardized form as the number of weeks of 
salary that employers are required to pay as severance payment upon 
dismissing redundant workers.  
A related contribution of our analysis is related to the uniquely extensive 
coverage of the WBES and Employing Workers datasets. Due to lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
productivity. In contrast, this paper studies misallocation of resources across 
heterogeneous plants, which has a clear link with aggregate productivity. Other 
studies look into the effects of employment protection on labor adjustment in a single 
country (Eslava et al., 2004;  Petrin and Sivadasan, 2013).  








comparable data for employment protections and productivity, the focus of 
the existent literature is largely confined to OECD countries, which limits the 
generalizability of the evidence (Caballero et al., 2013). In contrast, the dataset 
used here covers a large number of developed and developing economies, 
which exhibit great variation in the level of employment protection. The large 
country coverage of this dataset makes it possible to exploit the great cross-
country variation in dismissal cost to explain misallocation.  
The results show that dismissal cost has a significant positive effect on 
misallocation after several confounding institutional factors such as the level 
of competition and financial development are controlled for. In order to 
identify the channel through which employment protection affects 
misallocation, I test if the effect of employment protection is higher in 
industries with greater demand for labor adjustment. First, I use inherent 
differences across industries in terms of layoff rate due to technological and 
demand structures as a measure of labor adjustment demand (as in other 
studies such as Bassanini et al., 2009 and Cingano et al., 2010). Using 
difference-in-difference estimation strategy, I show that the effect of 
employment protection on misallocation is significantly higher in industries 
with higher layoff rate. In addition, I find that employment protection 
increases misallocation significantly more in industries with large positive or 
negative sales growth rates, revealing that its effect is bigger in dynamic 
industries with greater labor adjustment demand. These results conform to the 
view that employment protection imposes an institutional adjustment cost that 
reduces the reallocation of resources across plants. The results are robust to 
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multiple sensitivity tests including instrumental variable estimation, using 
alternative proxies of labor adjustment demand, controlling for various 
aspects of employment protection, and using alternative measures of 
misallocation.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
empirical methodology including the measurement of misallocation and the 
regression framework. Section 3.3 discusses data and measurement issues, and 
provides descriptive results for the measures of misallocation and 
employment protection. Section 3.4 provides the baseline regression results. 
Section 3.5 presents a number of sensitivity tests and section 3.6 concludes the 
chapter.  
3.2   Empirical Methodology 
This section introduces the measures of misallocation and describes the 
empirical methodology used for testing the effect of employment protection 
on misallocation.  
3.2.1   Measures of misallocation  
This subsection motivates the use of dispersions of the marginal (revenue) 
product of labor (MPL) and total factor productivity of revenue (TFPR) as 
indicators of misallocation of resources across plants. The main analysis in the 
study is based on the standard deviations of the logs of MPL and TFPR across 
plants within industries. However, I also conduct robustness tests using the 
interquartile range, which is less sensitive to outliers. 
Assuming a price-taking firm with Cobb-Douglas production technology, 
the marginal (revenue) product of labor (MPL), is defined as follows:                                                        








(3.1)										6# ≡ E LM8M#N = OE L8#N				, 
where p is output price, Q is quantity of output, L is labor input, and β is the 
output elasticity of labor that varies across industries and countries but is the 
same for plants within the same industry4.  
Previous studies have looked into differences in MPL that are measured 
under these assumptions to impute implicit distortions that induce 
misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Kamal 
and Lovely, 2012). Compared to the market wage rate, larger values of MPL 
reveal that the firm is under-employing labor whereas smaller values indicate 
that the firm is overemploying labor. Large dispersion in the marginal product 
of labor across plants thus imply significant unrealized gain in output caused 
by the failure to reallocate labor from plants with smaller marginal products to 
those with higher marginal products.  
In the spirit of the misallocation literature, I interpret within industry 
dispersions in the marginal product of labor as results of misallocation. In 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, any deviation from the average wage 
rate (,P) is modeled as an outcome of market distortions. Hence 6# ≡OE(8 #⁄ ) = ,P(1 + )) where ) is the idiosyncratic distortion firm i is facing, 
                                                          
4 Our measures of dispersion are unaffected if we make the alternative assumption 
that firms operates in a monopolistic market as is often done in the misallocation 
literature (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). If firms face a demand curve with a constant 
elastcity,  MPL takes the following form: 6# ≡ Q(R∗S)QT = (1 + 1$)O RST  where 1 = (M8/M)/8 < −1	is the price elasticity of demand. Since MPL in Equation (3.1) 
is a constant fraction of the MPL of a monopolistic firm, dispersions based on the log 
forms of both measures of MPL will be identical.   
76  Chapter 3 
which can be further decomposed into sub-components. Larger marginal 
products thus imply larger distortions that lower firm size. For example, Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009) and Kamal and Lovely (2012) report that state owned 
enterprises in China have lower marginal products of labor, implying that 
they get implicit labor subsidy.   
In the current setting, ) can be considered an outcome of a random 
exogenous productivity or demand shock that pushes the firm’s marginal 
product above or below the market wage rate. It is possible to re-write the 
above equation as 6# (1 + ))⁄ = ,P  and re-define ) > −1  as demand shock. 
In a frictionless market, a firm with a positive realization of demand shock will 
respond by hiring additional workers until its marginal product falls to the 
level of the market wage rate, and vice versa. After all firms readjust their 
labor, marginal products become equal to the wage rate so that there are no 
dispersions of marginal products. If labor adjustment costs are high relative to 
the shock, certain firms could find it unprofitable to adjust their labor inputs. 
For example, high dismissal cost could force a firm facing a negative 
realization of demand shock to keep its workers although their MPL has fallen 
below the wage rate. The higher the dismissal cost, the smaller becomes the 
proportion of firms that will find it profitable to fire redundant workers, and 
hence the greater the dispersion in observed marginal products. Other things 
constant, an industry in which labor adjustment cost is higher will have a 
greater dispersion of marginal products5.  
                                                          
5 In reality, dispersions in marginal products could arise for a number of other 
reasons than institutions that raise adjustment costs. Even in competitive markets 
such as the US economy, studies document substantial dispersion of marginal 
products and productivity (Syverson, 2011; Foster et al., 2001). Apart from data and 








Besides affecting the allocation of labor, employment protection can also 
have an additional effect of inducing capital misallocation in so far as capital 
and labor are substitutes. Therefore, I use the dispersion of total factor 
productivity, which also captures misallocation of capital, as a second measure 
of misallocation. Under Cobb-Douglas technology and constant returns to 
scale assumption, revenue productivity is defined as follows:   
(3.2)											 ≡ E8#X!$X				, 
where K is  capital stock.   
Although I simply refer to it as productivity, TFPR is different from 
physical productivity since revenues are used to measure output rather than 
physical output (Foster et al., 2008). Hence TFPR is the product of output 
prices and physical productivity. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that, in a 
monopolistic competition setting, the firm’s TFPR is proportional to the 
geometric mean of its marginal products of labor and capital. Therefore, TFPR 
captures distortions that affect the marginal products of both capital and labor, 
which makes it a composite measure of input misallocation. Intuitively, large 
values of TFPR imply that the firm is unable to increase its output due to 
distortions that affect its ability to increase its inputs. Therefore, high 
dispersions of TFPR reflect arbitrary distortions that lead to substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
measurement problems, this shows that non-policy factors such as sunk costs, 
market power, and the process of learning-by-doing among new entrants could 
induce productivity dispersions (Syverson, 2004). However, an important thesis in 
the misallocation literature is that, in spite of these differences, higher dispersions in 
marginal products are associated with greater market distortions that induce 
misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). 
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misallocation of inputs. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also provide a framework 
that shows how misallocation, measured as the variance of TFPR, has a 
negative effect on aggregate productivity.  
It is worthy to point out that the dispersions of MPL and TFPR are 
calculated among firms within two-digit ISIC industrial classifications. This is 
broader than the more detailed industrial classification used in previous 
studies that measure misallocation for one or a few countries (Syverson, 2004; 
Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). An important concern in this case is that differences 
in production techniques and demand conditions among sub-industries could 
lead to variations in wage rate. To the extent firms are heterogeneous and 
products differentiated, this argument might also apply within narrow 
industrial groups. To address this issue, labor input in this chapter is 
measured using labor compensation rather than number of workers or hours 
worked since it properly accounts for differences in wages reflecting human 
capital. The dispersions of MPL and TFPR calculated thus will not attribute 
differences in wage premia related to labor quality as distortions; for example, 
if a firm pays its workers twice more than its competitor because they are 
twice as productive, our measure of MPL will show that both firms have the 
same level of marginal productivity6. Moreover, relative to number of 
workers, labor compensation has the advantage of properly reflecting 
differences in intensity of labor use or hours worked.  
Moreover, dispersions of TFPR and MPL within two-digit industrial 
groups could capture not only distortions but also structural factors (e.g. 
differences in relative factor use across sub-industries). However, this point is 
                                                          
6 The same approach is followed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for measuring the marginal 
product of labor and TFPR. 








relevant only if input use across sub-industries tends to differ systematically 
across countries. If misallocation is overstated by similar proportions across 
countries, dispersions of MPL and TFPR within two-digit industries would 
still reasonably reflect differences in misallocation. To address this issue, I also 
carefully compare the results between the dispersion of revenue productivity 
(TFPR), which accounts both for capital and labor inputs, and the dispersion of 
the marginal product of labor (MPL), which is based only on labor use. 
3.2.2   Regression framework  
Existing studies analyze the effect of employment protection on productivity 
using aggregate industry-level data and firm-level data, mostly from OECD 
countries. Among the studies that rely on aggregate data, Bassanini et al. 
(2009) document the negative effect of dismissal regulation on productivity 
growth using industry-level panel data of OECD countries. Besley and 
Burgess (2004) find that pro-worker employment protection legislations are 
associated with lower output, employment, investment, and productivity in 
formal manufacturing across Indian states. The obvious disadvantage of using 
aggregate data is that it masks the effect of employment protection both on 
technological change and on misallocation across plants. The results are thus 
difficult to interpret, especially given the possibility that employment 
protection could positively affect innovation or workers’ productivity. 
Studies that use micro-level data, on the other hand, can directly test the 
effect of employment protection on firm productivity and job flows. Cingano 
et al. (2010) show that employment protection reduces value added per worker 
and investment among European manufacturing firms. They also find that 
80  Chapter 3 
dismissal regulations lower productivity growth in industries where layoff 
restrictions are more likely to be binding. Autor (2006) shows that the 
adoption of restrictive employment laws in US states had a negative effect on 
job flows and productivity among firms. While these micro-based studies can 
uncover how employment protection affects firm productivity, they disregard 
its effect of inducing misallocation across plants7.  
This study, in contrast, focuses on misallocation of resources across plants 
that have clear theoretical link with aggregate productivity. Due to the 
extensive country coverage of the plant-level WBES dataset, within-industry 
measures of dispersion can be calculated for a large number of countries. This 
allows us to investigate the effect of cross-country differences in employment 
protection on misallocation using country-industry data. I use the following 
cross-sectional empirical methodology: 
(3.3)				6YZ@ = 4([) + 9(\) + 	] @^ + _@ 		,		 
where the subscripts j and c are industry and country indices respectively. MIS 
refers to misallocation, measured as the within-industry dispersion of MPL or 
TFPR. EP is employment protection, in this case the cost of dismissing 
redundant workers. The vector X includes a set of country-level control 
variables that are discussed in the following subsection. The vector D denotes 
industry dummies that capture industry-specific demand and technological 
                                                          
7 An exception in this regard is the literature that documents the negative effect of 
employment protection on job flows and worker reallocation (Haltiwanger et al., 
2008; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Micco and Pagés, 2006; Martin and Scarpetta, 2012). In 
spite of its focus on labor allocation, this literature is principally descriptive since 
there is no clear-cut theoretical link between job flows and aggregate productivity. 
Moreover, these studies are largely confined to a few OECD countries.  








differences that can potentially affect the dispersion of marginal products. 
These include, for example, fixed entry costs that reduce competition, or the 
level of product differentiation that gives firms market power (Syverson, 
2004).  
If higher dismissal cost slows down the allocation of workers from less 
productive to more firms, other things constant, this leads to greater 
dispersion of marginal products and productivity. Therefore, the coefficient of 
interest, 4, is expected to have positive sign.  
Equation (3.3) is useful for estimating to what extent employment 
protection affects misallocation. However, it is not informative regarding the 
specific channel through which this effect is realized. Therefore, I consider an 
interaction effects model in order to test the hypothesis that employment 
protection induces misallocation by increasing the cost of labor adjustment. If 
the hypothesis is true and employment imposes an ‘institutional’ cost for 
adjusting labor, its effect will be larger in industries with greater demand for 
labor adjustment. In this study, I consider two sources of differences in labor 
adjustment demand among industries.  
Firstly, I look into exogenous differences among industries in their 
demand for adjusting their labor inputs. Studies have shown that there are 
systematic and significant differences across industries in their demand for 
labor adjustment measured in terms of job flow rate, worker reallocation and 
layoff rate. The ranking of industries based on these measures is also 
consistent across countries (Haltiwanger et al., 2008; Micco and Pagés, 2006). 
The potential reasons for this empirical regularity could be differences in 
82  Chapter 3 
technological structure, the nature of demand shocks, and variations in size 
among firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2008). For example, the nature of demand in 
some industries could entail larger demand volatility, whereas the 
technological structure may determine the necessary level of specialization of 
workers or the substitutability of different worker types. These and other 
factors could induce differences in the ease with which labor can be adjusted 
across industries8.  
In this study, I follow Bassanini et al. (2009) and use the concept of layoff 
propensity which gauges the extent to which industries depend on layoffs to 
adjust their labor9. To test if dismissal cost has larger effect on industries with 
higher layoff rate, I estimate the following regression model:  
(3.4)				6YZ@ = O[ ∗ #abcdd@ + 	] @^ + 	e( ^) + _@ 		,		 
where Layoffj is the benchmark layoff propensity that varies across industries, 
but not across countries. @^ and ^ are respectively vectors of industry- and 
country-effects dummies. Since industries with higher layoff propensity will 
be most affected by employment protection, the expected sign of O in the 
regression model for the interaction effect of layoff propensity is positive. 
                                                          
8 For example, textile industries experience frequent demand shocks due to changes 
in fashion and preferences, which could increase their demand for labor adjustment 
(Micco and Pagés, 2006).  
9 Bassanini et al. (2009) argue that layoff propensity is the most relevant proxy of labor 
adjustment demand compared to other alternatives such as workflows and 
employment turnover because it has a direct relation to dismissal cost. They find that 
dismissal cost has significantly larger negative effect on productivity growth in 
industries that have higher layoff propensity. A number of studies also document that 
employment protection has greater effect on the performance of industries with 
inherently greater labor adjustment demand (Micco and Pagés, 2006 and Cingano et 
al., 2010). 








Equation (3.4) is the standard difference-in-difference estimation strategy 
that exploits variations across industries and countries while removing all 
differences across industries and countries through the inclusion of dummy 
variables. Given multiple sources of institutional heterogeneity across 
countries, the inclusion of country effects is an important step for reducing 
potential omitted variable problems.  
As a benchmark for layoff propensity, I use the average percentage ratio 
of annual layoffs to total employment in US industries, which is taken from 
Bassanini et al. (2009). This variable is measured at the level of 2-digit ISIC 
codes, and is expected to capture inherent differences in reliance on layoffs 
across industries. Since the US has the least restrictive employment protection 
legislation, US data is believed to reflect inherent industrial features better 
than data from other countries. Bassanini et al. (2009) argue that industry 
rankings by layoff rate are consistent across countries and over time, implying 
that differences in layoff rate are inherently exogenous. For sensitivity test, I 
also use a binary form of US layoff rate and alternative layoff rate taken from 
UK data.   
In addition to layoff propensity, I also consider labor adjustment demand 
differences induced by output growth. Industries that are growing fast are 
likely to have greater need for hiring workers, and hence to be affected 
significantly more by employment protection. Since sales growth varies 
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significantly across countries and industries, it offers a source of variation that 
can be used for testing the effect of employment protection on misallocation10.  
However, the relationship between labor adjustment demand and sales 
growth is not linear since sales growth can be positive or negative. Demand 
for labor adjustment is high when sales growth is large and positive (i.e. when 
the industry is booming) and when it is large and negative (i.e. when the 
industry is shrinking). Therefore, the effect of employment protection on 
misallocation is expected to be higher in expanding and shrinking industries. I 
use the following specification to test this hypothesis: 
(3.5)			6YZ@ = O[ ∗ g/c,hℎ@j + k[ ∗ g/c,hℎ@ + Bg/c,hℎ@j 			+ 9g/c,hℎ@ 			+ ] @^ + 	e( ^) + _@ 	,		 
where Growthjc is the rate of sales growth in industry j and country c.  
The interaction term between the measure of employment protection and 
the square of sales growth reflects the non-linear relationship between sales 
growth and labor adjustment. The coefficient of interest, O, is expected to be 
positive implying a U-shaped relationship between sales growth and the 
marginal effect of employment protection. Given that labor adjustment 
demand is high in expanding and shrinking industries, the marginal effect of 
employment protection is expected to be higher in industries with large 
                                                          
10 Since sales growth and sales volatility are positively correlated across industries 
(Imbs, 2007), this approach is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that industries with 
greater sales volatility are affected more by employment protection. Micco and Pagés 
(2006) show that employment protection reduces job reallocation significantly more 
in industries with high sales volatility since a larger share of firms have labor 
adjustment demand in these industries. Cuñat and Melitz (2012) use the same notion 
to show that countries with more flexible labor markets are more likely to specialize 
in sectors that exhibit greater demand volatility. 








positive and negative sales growth rates. Note that both sales growth and its 
squared term are included to capture their direct effect on misallocation.  
For estimating Equation (3.5), I use sales growth rate at country-industry 
level from the INDSTAT database (UNIDO, 2012). This variable is the best 
proxy for labor adjustment demand due to output expansion within an 
industry. Unfortunately, detailed industry data is available for relatively small 
number of countries, considerably reducing the number of observations 
available for analysis. Therefore, I check the sensitivity of the results using 
alternative proxies such as the proportion of plants within each country-
industry that reported sales growth and the average size of industries.  
3.2.3   Control variables  
In order to isolate the effect of employment protection on misallocation in 
Equation (3.3), it is necessary to control for a number of institutional factors 
that could affect misallocation. This subsection briefly discusses four 
institutional factors with such an effect.  
i) Barriers to external competition. Exposure to external competition because 
of openness to trade and foreign direct investment can enhance allocative 
efficiency. As highlighted by the seminal work of Melitz (2003) trade openness 
intensifies competition and increases aggregate productivity by allowing more 
productive firms to expand and the least efficient firms to exit. There is also an 
extensive empirical literature supporting the reallocative effect of trade and 
FDI. In this paper, trade openness is measured using trade intensity, 
calculated as imports plus exports in real prices expressed as a percentage of 
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GDP using data from the Penn World Table dataset (Feenstra et al., 2013). In 
addition, I control for net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, taken from the 
World Development Indicators database.      
ii) Barriers to domestic competition. Regulatory constraints that discourage the 
entry of new firms can exacerbate misallocation. A large literature studies the 
economic consequences of regulatory entry barriers in the form of high 
registration costs and licensing restrictions (Djankov et al., Boedo and 
Mukoyama, 2012).  As a measure of entry barriers, I use the number of 
procedures that newly entering firms have to complete in order to register 
officially. This indicator was originally developed and used as a proxy of entry 
regulation by Djankov et al. (2002). 
iii) Financial frictions. Financial frictions are among the most widely studied 
determinants of misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013). The level of 
financial development in a market can affect allocative efficiency in two ways. 
Firstly, efficient financial intermediation increases firm entry by lowering the 
cost of financial capital, thus intensifying competition and forcing inefficient 
incumbents to exit. Secondly, well-developed financial markets are more 
capable at identifying profitable firms and reallocating capital towards them, 
thus reducing misallocation. To control for differences in financial 
development, I use a proxy of credit availability, measured as domestic credit 
extended for the private sector as a percentage of GDP (Beck et al., 2010).  
iv) Quality of regulation.  The extent to which employment protection 
legislation is put to practice could vary across countries, depending on the 
quality of enforcing and regulating institutions. Caballero et al. (2013) and 
Micco and Pagés (2006) find that the efficiency of labor allocation is lower in 








countries where employment protection is more likely to be enforced. To 
account for this, I control for an indicator of regulatory quality taken from the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicator’s database.  
3.3   Data and Measurement 
3.3.1   The WBES dataset 
The main data source for our analysis is the World Bank’s Enterprises Survey 
(WBES) dataset. The WBES is an ongoing project that collects firm-level data 
worldwide. The major advantage of the WBES dataset is that it is collected 
systematically using standardized survey instruments. The dataset thus 
provides comparable data that is unique in its extensive country coverage. 
Sampling for the WBES is conducted using stratified sampling procedure to 
ensure representative coverage. First, the number of industry groups to be 
covered across each major sector (services, manufacturing and non-agriculture 
primary activities) is determined. For manufacturing, industry grouping is 
based on 2-digit ISIC classification. The number of industry groups to be 
covered in each country is determined according to the size of the total 
economy which is taken as a proxy for the universe of firms. Once the number 
of industries to be covered is decided, the largest industry groups in the 
economy, in terms of contribution to output and employment, are selected. 
In the second stage, a sampling equation is used to determine a 
representative sample size per industry group. The sample size is chosen to 
achieve representativeness for the proportion of plants and the average sales 
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in the industry. Finally, further stratification is made based on firm-size and 
geographical location to select the plants that are covered by the survey11.  
Data collection started in 2002 and different countries have been covered 
in subsequent years. Panel data is available for some countries; however, the 
country coverage of the panel dataset is limited. The analysis in this paper is 
performed using a cross-section dataset that includes the largest number of 
available observations for each country. When multiple years of data are 
available for a country, the year for which the largest number of observations 
are available is selected12.  
I started compiling the cross-section data by removing non- 
manufacturing plants, and observations with missing or incomplete data for 
the essential variables, i.e. sales, intermediate inputs, labor cost and, when 
relevant, book value of capital stock. Similarly, loss-making plants with 
negative value added are removed. Then I remove outliers that are potentially 
measured with error and hence can significantly influence the measures of 
misallocation. Outliers in this case are defined as the top and bottom 
percentiles of the marginal product of labor (MPL) and total factor revenue 
productivity (TFPR) within each country-industry group. In addition, I 
remove 30 industries for which the interquartile range for the log of MPL has 
values above three since the substantial dispersion suggests that data for these 
industries is likely to be measured with error.  
                                                          
11 The WBES excludes fully state owned enterprises in order to achieve comparability 
across countries.  A full description of the sampling procedure can be found in the 
following website: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology/ 
12 In the regression analysis, I include dummies that indicate year of data collection to 
capture potential differences in the economic environment across the years in which 
the data is collected. 








Once the data is cleaned, a number of industries end up with too few valid 
observations compared to the original sample. To make sure that the final 
sample is not too far from the original sample which is designed to be 
representative, I exclude certain industries that have relatively small coverage. 
Specifically, I exclude industries with fewer than five observations, and 
industries that, compared to the original dataset, end up with less than half the 
number of observations.   
I exclude from the analysis all countries that have fewer than 40 
observations after cleaning, and whose sample in terms of coverage relative to 
the original dataset is less than 40%. While the decision for the cut-off point is 
rather arbitrary, it ensures the exclusion of countries for which the final 
dataset is not likely to be representative. This leads to a final dataset of 91 
countries with a total of 29,589 plants13. The analysis is conducted with a 
dataset of 731 industries of 2-digit level ISIC classification14. For measuring 
revenue productivity, an additional capital stock data is required, which is less 
frequently available. As a result, the number of countries covered for this 
alternative measure falls to 61 and the number of industries to 501. 
Table (3.A1) in the appendix presents for each country the year of data 
collection, the coverage of the final sample relative to the original, the number 
                                                          
13 The larger country coverage relative to the previous chapter is because of less restrictive 
data demands in this chapter. First, firm-level capital stock data is not needed for measuring 
MPL; second, additional data demands for measuring aggregate TFP do not apply in this 
chapter compared to the previous one. 
14 Detailed ISIC codes are not available for certain industries, and thus around 5 
percent of the industries in the dataset are defined at a higher level of aggregation 
that includes two to three 2-digit ISIC codes. 
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of observations, GDP per capita and summary values of labor productivity 
and wage rate in the dataset. As shown at the bottom of column (3), the 
average coverage of the final dataset is 76%, implying that about a quarter of 
the observations in the original sample are lost in the data cleaning process, 
mainly because they provide incomplete data15. Column (2) shows that the 
average sample size across countries is 325. There is large difference in sample 
size across countries: whereas large countries such as India, Brazil and China 
have well above a thousand observations, smaller ones such as Estonia and 
Swaziland have only around 40 observations. The dataset covers mostly low- 
and middle-income countries with average per capita income of USD 3,700, 
ranging from Ireland (USD 49,000) to Democratic Republic of Congo (USD 
125), all in current prices.    
Given that micro data is subject to numerous possibilities of measurement 
error, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of the WBES dataset by 
comparing it with external sources. For this purpose, Table (3.A1) provides 
measures of labor productivity (value added per worker) and wage rate that 
are imputed from the WBES dataset, and GDP per capita in current prices. 
Since there are substantial differences in labor productivity and wage rate 
across plants in the same country, median values are used as summary 
statistics. Correlation results show that labor productivity, wage rate and GDP 
per capita are strongly correlated with coefficients above 0.90. The last two 
columns of Table (3.A1) report the ratios of the labor productivity and wage 
                                                          
15 This is partly due to missing data for sales volume, which is not available for around 6% of 
the firms in the country-industry groups selected for analysis. More than 8% additional 
observations are excluded because they do not report labor compensation. The remaining 
data loss, for around 7% of the observations, is due to the exclusion of firms that have either 
incomplete data for intermediate inputs or have negative value added.  








rate to GDP per capita. On average, labor productivity and wage rates are 
about 4.3 and 1.6 times larger than GDP per capita respectively, reflecting the 
high productivity of the manufacturing sector relative to the rest of the 
economy. The wage rate to GDP per capita ratio also has reasonable values 
across countries. The largest values of the ratio are in poor countries where 
low-productivity agricultural sectors are important, such as Democratic 
Republic of Congo (6.4), Afghanistan (4.8) and Kenya (4.2), whereas it is below 
one in many middle-income countries. Overall, the WBES dataset appears to 
provide reasonable values of wage rate and labor productivity relative to GDP 
per capita.   
For measuring the marginal product of labor, I use data on total 
production, cost of intermediate inputs and labor inputs. Additional data for 
book value capital stock is used for measuring revenue productivity. Output is 
defined as value added, which is calculated as the difference between sales 
and the cost of intermediate inputs. Cost of intermediate inputs is calculated 
by adding up three major cost categories: energy consumption (fuel, electricity 
and other energy costs), cost of raw materials and overhead and other 
expenses. To account for differences in hours worked and human capital, labor 
input is measured using labor cost rather than employment. The elasticity 
parameter β in Equation (3.1) is calculated using the average share of labor in 
value added within each country-industry. Since β is an additive element in 
the log of MPL, wrongly measuring it will not have any effect on the measures 
of dispersion.  
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Table 3.1: Correlation and descriptive results for measures of misallocation 
 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  
1. SD(MPL) 1 
 
    
  
   
    
  





    
  
3. IQR(MPL) 0.674 0.519 1    
  
 
0 0     
  
4. IQR(TFPR) 0.429 0.682 0.473 1     
 0 0 0      
5. LP1 -0.278 -0.278 -0.278 -0.211 1  
  
 
0 0 0 0.001   
  
6. LP2 -0.055 -0.024 -0.051 0.095 0.570 1   
 0.278 0.701 0.318 0.133 0    
7. LP3 0.028 -0.017 0.012 -0.000 0.578 0.645 1  
 0.450 0.708 0.752 0.994 0 0   
8. Wage -0.130 -0.112 -0.153 -0.094 0.650 0.615 0.880 1 
 
0.001 0.013 0 0.038 0 0 0 
 
Notes: The standard deviation (SD) and interquartile range (IQR) are calculated using log 
transformed values of the marginal product of labor (MPL) and total factor revenue 
productivity (TFPR) within each country-industry group. LP1 and LP2 are respectively 
country-level and industry-level measures of aggregate labor productivity (value added per 
worker) computed using data from INDSTAT database (UNIDO, 2012). LP3 and Wages are 
calculated as the median value of value added per worker and wage rate across all plants 
within each country-industry group. The cells indicate values of pairwise correlation 
coefficients and their p-values. 
Table (3.1) provides correlation results between the four measures of 
dispersion, three alternative measures of labor productivity and the median 
wage rate. The Table includes the standard deviations (SD) and interquartile 
ranges of MPL and TFPR. LP1 and LP2 are measures of aggregate labor 
productivity at country level and at country-industry level respectively. Both 
are calculated as value added per worker in USD using data from the 
INDSTAT database (UNIDO, 2012). LP3 and wages respectively refer to labor 
productivity and wage rate at country-industry level, both calculated from the 
WBES dataset using median values across plants within each industry.    








Firstly, the Table shows that the four measures of dispersion are strongly 
correlated with each other. For example, the standard deviations of (the logs 
of) MPL and TFPR have a large correlation coefficient of 0.62, indicating the 
internal consistency between the two measures of misallocation. All the four 
measures of dispersion also have significant negative correlation with LP1, 
although this correlation is not consistent for the other measures of labor 
productivity. However, all measures of dispersion are strongly correlated with 
the median wage rate, implying that misallocation is associated with lower per 
capita labor compensation. In general, these results suggest that larger 
misallocation is associated with lower productivity levels as has been shown 
in previous studies (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). 
Descriptive statistics given in Table (3.2) also show that the standard 
deviations of (the logs of) MPL and TFPR have large average values. In 
addition, both measures of dispersion have large standard deviations 
suggesting that the level of misallocation varies significantly across industries 
and countries. The average interquartile range of (the log of) MPL is almost 
one. This gap implies that the average ratio of MPL between the top and 
bottom quartiles is 2.7, implying substantial dispersions of MPL. The average 
interquartile range for TFPR is 1.15, suggesting that on average the revenue 
productivity of the top quartile is almost 3.2 times that of the bottom quartile. 
These large dispersions indicate the presence of significant misallocation of 
resources across plants that lowers aggregate productivity below the 
potentially achievable level. 
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3.3.2   Employment protection 
In this study, I focus on dismissal cost, which is one of the most important and 
widely studied aspects of employment protection. Cross-country data for 
dismissal cost is taken from the website of the World Bank’s Employing 
Workers’ project, which is a part of the Doing Business Indicators program.   




Dev. Min Max 
A. Measures of misallocation       
SD(MPL) 731 0.828 0.330 0.128 2.44 
SD(TFPR) 501 0.933 0.274 0.223 2.126 
IQR(MPL) 731 0.99 0.451 0.038 2.96 
IQR(TFPR) 501 1.153 0.44 0.064 2.921 
B. Measures of employment protection 
Dismissal cost 91 15.915 13.957 0 92.445 
Dismissal procedures index 91 2.885 2.114 0 7.000 
Hiring procedures index 91 0.251 0.225 0 0.800 
C: Control Variables       
Trade openness  91 82.978 35.541 27.197 199.755 
FDI inflow  91 4.382 3.741 -4.653 20.254 
Registration procedures to start a 
business  91 9.442 2.738 4.000 17.875 
Private domestic credit 91 37.279 32.684 3.321 167.308 
Regulatory quality 91 -0.200 0.735 -2.060 1.728 
Notes: The summary statistics are calculated at country-industry level in panel A, and at 
country-level for panels B and C. Trade openness, FDI inflow and private domestic credit are 
all calculated as a percentage of GDP. All control variables are averaged over the years 2001-
2010 to match the years of data collection of the WBES dataset. 
Dismissal cost is calculated as the average number of weekly wages an 
employer is required to pay upon dismissing redundant employees with 1, 5 
and 10 years of seniority. The cost of firing is expressed in terms of weekly 
wages in order to make it comparable across countries16. First developed by 
                                                          
16 Alternatively, one could use the broader alternative measure of dismissal cost that 
includes both severance payment and the cost of advance notice requirements. I use 








Botero et al. (2004), this measure provides a reasonable approximation for the 
financial cost of firing employees. Detailed data for employees of different 
seniority levels is available only for 2010 and 2011, and the average value of 
the two years is used for this study.  
Table (3.2) provides description results for dismissal cost and two 
additional indices of employment protection. Dismissal cost requirements are 
on average 18 weeks long, although there is substantial difference across 
countries. In DRC, Iraq and Uganda, there are no dismissal cost requirements 
whereas in Zimbabwe dismissal cost is equal to almost two years of wages (92 
weeks). Sri Lanka and Indonesia have the next largest dismissal cost 
requirements that are slightly above one year of wages.  
The two additional indices of employment protection in Table (3.2) 
measure the level of procedural burden that employers face while hiring and 
firing workers. These indices are important for measuring the non-financial 
aspects of employment protection legislation that use bureaucratic procedures 
for protecting employment. Higher values of dismissal procedures indicate that 
employers face greater procedural hurdles while dismissing redundant 
workers, for example because of approval requirements from relevant 
authorities and worker re-assignment obligations. Similarly, higher values of 
hiring procedures show greater burden in employment procedures such as 
restrictions on fixed-term contracts and on increasing working hours. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
severance payment in this paper because it is by far the larger of the two and because 
it is the ‘net’ dismissal cost (i.e. unlike for the advance notice payment, the employer 
does not receive work in exchange for the severance payment). The results in this 
paper are robust for both ways of measuring dismissal cost.  
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Appendix 3.B details the construction of the two indices using raw data from 
the World Bank’s Employing Workers dataset. Correlation results between the 
three indicators show that only one pairwise correlation - between dismissal 
cost and dismissal procedures – is significant with a coefficient of 0.27. Since 
the variables appear to measure different aspects of employment protection, I 
conduct sensitivity tests by controlling for the two indices in the regression 
analysis.  
3.4   Baseline Regressions Results 
As indicated in the data description, the WBES is designed to give 
representative values for total sales and the number of plants per industry. 
However, around a quarter of the total observations are not available in the 
version of the dataset used for analysis largely because of missing data. To 
account for the resulting difference in data reliability across industries, I 
estimate all regressions with analytic weights, using as weighting variable the 
coverage rate i.e. the ratio of the sample size in the final dataset relative to the 
original dataset. This leads to the GLS estimator in which observations from 
industries with higher coverage are given greater weight since they are likely 
to have smaller variance17.  
                                                          
17 Potentially because of the limited variation in the weighting variable (which varies 
between 40 and 100 percent), the results are qualitatively similar when unweighted 
regression is used. On a related note, all regressions are estimated assuming that the 
standard errors could have arbitrary correlation within countries. This cluster 
estimator is especially appropriate for Equation (3.3) where country effects are not 
included. Even in Equations (3.4) & (3.5), clustering the error terms can account for 
any arbitrary correlation that persists after country effects are removed.  Finally, 
dummies showing year of data collection are included in all regressions since, as is 
shown in Table (3.A1), data is collected in different years across countries.  








Table (3.3) provides the results for the specification given by Equation 
(3.3). The dependent variables are the standard deviations of the logs of MPL 
and TFPR within each country-industry group. Note that the number of 
observations falls substantially when TFPR is used due to the additional data 
requirement for capital stock. The results show that dismissal cost has 
significant positive effect on the standard deviations of both MPL and TFPR. 
The standard deviations of (the logs of) MPL and TFPR increase by 0.004-0.005 
points when dismissal cost increases by one week of wages. This implies that 
an increase in dismissal cost from the 10th percentile (4.3 weeks in Armenia) to 
the 90th percentile (27 weeks in Bangladesh) is associated with an increase in 
the standard deviation of MPL by 11 percent relative to the mean 
(22.7*0.4/0.83). A similar increase of dismissal cost is associated with 12 
percent rise in the standard deviation of TFPR. 
Among the control variables, private domestic credit appears with a 
negative and significant coefficient in regression (1), indicating that a well-
developed financial sector reduces misallocation. The significant positive 
coefficients of regulatory quality suggest that misallocation is larger in 
countries with better regulatory quality. This is potentially because high-
quality regulatory institutions are more capable at enforcing employment 
protection and other legislation (Caballero et al., 2013; Micco and Pagés, 2006). 
In the next section, I conduct a sensitivity analysis with an interaction effects 
model to test if the effect of employment protection depends on regulatory 
quality.   
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Table 3.3: The effect of employment protection on misallocation  
 (1) (2) 
 SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
   
Dismissal cost 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade openness 0.009 -0.095 
 (0.075) (0.069) 
Net FDI inflow -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Registration procedures  0.004 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
Private domestic credit -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulatory quality 0.179*** 0.144*** 
 (0.034) (0.039) 
Constant 1.354*** 1.268*** 
 (0.138) (0.163) 
   
Observations 731 501 
R-squared 0.368 0.223 
Notes: The regressions are based on Equation (3.3). The dependent variables are within-
industry standard deviations (SD) of log-transformed values of MPL and TFPR. Country- 
and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data collection are included in all 
regressions. The standard errors given in parentheses are corrected for clustering by country. 
The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Next, I present the results for the regression models that include 
interaction terms between dismissal cost and indicators of labor adjustment 
demand. The aim of these regressions is to test if the effect of employment 
protection is higher in industries with greater labor adjustment demand. The 
first two regressions of Table (3.4) are based on the specification of Equation 
(3.4) and the last two are based on Equation (3.5). 
 
 








Table 3.4: The effect of employment protection on misallocation: interactions 
with labor adjustment demand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost X US layoff rate 0.102*** 0.133***   
 (0.036) (0.035)   
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)2   0.019 0.095*** 
   (0.019) (0.025) 
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)    -0.012 -0.025*** 
   (0.009) (0.007) 
Sales growth2   -0.011 -2.151*** 
   (0.444) (0.543) 
Sales growth    0.259 0.753*** 
   (0.287) (0.228) 
Constant 1.231*** 1.240*** 1.806*** 0.944*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.043) (0.078) 
     
Observations 731 501 370 236 
R-squared 0.602 0.481 0.635 0.517 
Notes: Regressions (1) & (2) are based on Equation (3.4) and regressions (3) & (4) are based 
on Equation (3.5). The dependent variables are within-industry standard deviations of log-
transformed values of MPL and TFPR. Country- and industry-effects and dummies showing 
year of data collection are included in all regressions. The standard errors given in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering by country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The interaction term between dismissal cost and the benchmark layoff 
propensity is positive and significant for the standard deviations of both MPL 
and TFPR. This confirms that employment protection has a larger effect on 
misallocation in industries that have greater demand for labor adjustment. The 
marginal effect of employment protection on misallocation is also large when 
we compare industries with different layoff rate. The standard deviation of 
MPL is 25 percent higher relative to its mean when we compare an industry at 
the 90th percentile of layoff rate (ISIC code 31 with layoff rate of 8.1%) in a 
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country at the 90th percentile of dismissal cost (Bangladesh with dismissal cost 
of 27 weeks) against another industry at the 10th percentile of layoff rate (ISIC 
code 24 with layoff rate of 3.1%) in a country at the 10th percentile of dismissal 
cost (Armenia with dismissal cost of 4.3 weeks). The equivalent increase for 
the standard deviation for TFPR is also a large 29 percent18. 
The last two regressions of the Table are based on Equation (3.5) in which 
industry-level sales growth rate is interacted with dismissal cost. As described 
earlier, dismissal cost is interacted with both sales growth rate and its squared 
term because labor adjustment demand is higher in expanding and shrinking 
industries19. Note that the number of observations declines significantly due to 
lack of sales growth data in many countries.  
The interaction term between dismissal cost and the square of sales 
growth is insignificant for the standard deviation of MPL, but it is positive and 
significant for the standard deviation of TFPR. The positive coefficient in the 
last regression implies that the marginal effect of dismissal cost is higher in 
industries experiencing sales expansion and decline. Since expanding or 
shrinking industries are expected to have greater labor adjustment demand, 
this is suggestive that dismissal cost reduces labor reallocation. However, the 
insignificant coefficient in regression (3) casts doubt on the reliability of this 
                                                          
18 For the standard deviation of MPL this is calculated as 0.102*100(0.081*27 – 
0.031*4.33)/0.828 = 25%. The calculation for TFPR is: 0.133*100(0.081*27 - 
0.031*4.33)/0.933 = 29%. 
19 Out of the 370 industries for which sales growth data is available, 54 industries 
(around 15 percent of the total) have negative sales growth rates. This is based on 
sales growth data averaged over the years 2001-2010 in order to roughly match the 
periods of data collection for the WBES dataset. 








result. In the next section, I consider alternative measures of labor adjustment 
demand to check the sensitivity of this result.  
Overall, the results reported in this section attest that employment 
protection is associated with greater dispersion of the marginal product of 
labor and total factor productivity. The evidence shows that employment 
protection has the unintended consequence of inducing misallocation of 
resources, and thus lowering aggregate productivity. The effect of 
employment protection is also higher in industries that have greater demand 
for adjusting their labor inputs, implying that employment protection induces 
misallocation by affecting the process of labor reallocation.  
3.5   Sensitivity Tests 
3.5.1   Data quality and model specification  
In this subsection, I provide a number of sensitivity tests to check the 
robustness of the baseline regression results. More specifically, I consider 
alternative measures of labor adjustment demand and misallocation, and 
check for potential omitted variable problems. 
i) Alternative measures of labor adjustment demand  
The results for the interaction effects models could depend on the way 
labor adjustment demand is measured, which calls for sensitivity tests using 
alternative measures of labor adjustment demand. The baseline estimation for 
Equation (3.4) is based on benchmark layoff propensity data from US, which 
arguably has the most permissive labor market in the world. It is nonetheless 
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possible that this layoff rate data reflects institutional features of the US 
economy. In addition, the data could suffer from measurement error if there 
are mismatches in industry aggregation between the US and other countries.   
Therefore, I provide sensitivity tests using two alternative benchmarks of 
layoff propensity. The first is a binary form of US layoff rate that classifies 
industries into high- and low-layoff groups using the average value across 
industries as cut-off point. The advantage of this measure is that it captures 
broad qualitative differences in layoff propensity across industries using a 
binary classification that is less susceptible to measurement error (Bassanini et 
al., 2009). As an alternative benchmark of layoff propensity, I use industry-
level layoff rate data from the UK, another country with less constraining 
labor regulation. The data is again taken from Bassanini et al. (2009) who used 
it for measuring the same concept of labor adjustment demand. 
Table 3.5: Regression results using alternative measures of layoff propensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost X US layoff dummy 0.002** 0.002**   
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Dismissal cost X UK layoff rate   0.030 0.040 
   (0.025) (0.026) 
     
Constant 1.323*** 0.834*** 1.303*** 0.804*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.041) 
     
Observations 731 501 731 501 
R-squared 0.600 0.471 0.598 0.469 
Notes: The dependent variables are within-industry standard deviations of log-transformed 
values of MPL and TFPR. Country- and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data 
collection are included in all regressions. Standard errors given in parentheses are corrected 
for clustering by country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 








Table (3.5) provides the regression results for the two alternative measures 
of layoff propensity. In the first two regressions, the interaction term between 
dismissal cost and the US layoff dummy is positive and significant. This result 
suggests that industries with qualitatively higher layoff rate are affected more 
by employment protection. The last two regressions show that the interaction 
term between dismissal cost and layoff rate from UK are not significant, 
suggesting that the results are sensitive to the source of the benchmark layoff 
propensity. The results thus appear to depend on the assumption that the US 
labor market is the most competitive, which is an assumption adopted by 
several studies (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).  
Next, I turn to the interaction effect model with sales growth, which is the 
second measure of labor adjustment demand. The baseline regression for 
Equation (3.5) is based on sales growth data at country-industry level from 
UNIDO’s database. Due to the relatively low availability of industry-level 
sales data in this database, there is considerable decline in the number of 
observations in the baseline regressions. For this reason, I use alternative 
proxies for sales growth.  
Although the WBES dataset provides no information on sales growth 
rates, it includes information on whether or not the firm experienced sales 
growth in the past one year. As an alternative measure of sales growth, I use 
the proportion of firms that register sales growth within each country-industry 
group. An important advantage of this variable is that it refers to sales growth 
in the same industries for which we measure misallocation.  
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Table 3.6: Regression results using alternative measures for sales growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost X Growing plants 0.010** -0.003   
 (0.004) (0.006)   
Dismissal cost X Size    -0.003*** -0.002*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of growing plants -0.168 -0.077   
 (0.132) (0.181)   
Size    0.101*** 0.054* 
   (0.025) (0.027) 
Constant 1.154*** 0.964*** 1.144*** 0.858*** 
 (0.108) (0.053) (0.071) (0.067) 
     
Observations 488 340 731 501 
R-squared 0.620 0.511 0.613 0.477 
Notes: The dependent variables are within-industry standard deviations of log-transformed 
values of MPL and TFPR. Country- and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data 
collection are included in all regressions. The standard errors given in parentheses are 
corrected for clustering by country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
As a second alternative measure of sales growth among plants in the 
WBES dataset, I use the average size of plants in each country-industry. 
Generally, smaller businesses are more dynamic, in part because they tend to 
be young ventures and adjust their inputs through the process of learning-by-
doing (Dunne et al., 1989). As a result, the process of job reallocation has been 
found to be higher among smaller firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2008). Therefore, 
the average size of plants in an industry can be used as a proxy for the 
magnitude of demand for labor adjustment in the industry. For measuring 
firm size, I take the average number of permanent employees across plants 
within each country-industry group.  
Table (3.6) provides regression results using the proportion of plants that 
registered sales increase, and the average firm size in an industry. Unlike sales 








growth rate, these variables have a linear relationship with labor adjustment 
demand and thus only a linear interaction term is included in the regressions. 
Since labor adjustment demand is expected to be higher when the proportion 
of growing plants is larger and the average plant size is lower, the interaction 
terms involving these variables are expected to be positive and negative 
respectively.  
From regression (1) in Table (3.6), the interaction term between dismissal 
cost and the proportion of growing plants is positive and significant. This 
implies that the marginal effect of employment protection is larger in 
industries where a bigger proportion of plants are growing. The interaction 
term, however, turns insignificant in regression (2) where the standard 
deviation of TFPR is considered. One possibility for this result could be the 
considerable decline in the number of observations in this regression 
compared to Table (3.3), due to lack of response for the survey question on 
sales growth.  
Regressions (3) & (4) show that the interaction term between dismissal 
cost and average firm size per industry is negative and significant as expected. 
The marginal effect of employment protection thus declines as the average 
firm size of the industry increases, confirming that industries dominated by 
smaller firms (and thus have greater labor adjustment demand) are more 
severely affected by employment protection. To sum up, these sensitivity tests 
for the most part show that the results are robust for different ways of 
measuring labor adjustment demand.  
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ii) Model specification 
The specifications given by Equations (3.4) & (3.5) are unlikely to suffer 
from omitted variable bias since country effects are included, removing any 
potential cross-country differences. However, the regression model of 
Equation (3.3) can suffer from omitted variable problems since several 
institutional factors can affect misallocation. In this subsection, I consider two 
potential misspecification problems.  
The first problem is that dismissal cost could capture the effects of other 
related aspects of employment protection that do not directly affect the cost of 
dismissal. Since dismissal cost is likely to be positively correlated with other 
aspects of employment protection such as procedural requirements, failing to 
control for these factors could bias the coefficients of dismissal cost upwards. 
Therefore, I re-estimate Equation (3.3) by including the two additional indices 
of dismissal and hiring procedures that are presented in Table (3.2). Secondly, 
the effect of employment protection on misallocation could be unequal across 
countries. Caballero et al. (2013) and Micco and Pagés (2006) find that the effect 
of employment protection on economic outcomes tends to be higher in 
countries where employment protection is more likely to be enforced. To 
account for this, I extend Equation (3.3) by including an interaction term 
between dismissal cost and regulatory quality. If differences in law 













Table 3.7: Regression results with additional controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dismissal cost x Regulatory quality   -0.000 0.002* 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Dismissal procedures  0.005 0.009   
  (0.009) (0.008)   
Hiring procedures  -0.125 -0.107   
 (0.095) (0.091)   
Trade openness 0.006 -0.096 0.009 -0.124 
 (0.074) (0.068) (0.077) (0.076) 
Net FDI inflow -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Registration procedures  0.005 0.007 0.004 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) 
Private domestic credit -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulatory quality 0.190*** 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.101** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.044) (0.050) 
Constant 1.366*** 1.264*** 1.355*** 1.222*** 
 (0.159) (0.197) (0.140) (0.166) 
     
Observations 731 501 731 501 
R-squared 0.374 0.231 0.368 0.234 
Notes: The dependent variables are within-industry standard deviations of the logs of MPL 
and TFPR. Country- and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data collection are 
included in all regressions. The standard errors given in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering by country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table (3.7) provides the regression results for the two sensitivity tests. In 
the first two regressions, I control for the two indices measuring the stringency 
of dismissal and hiring procedures.  Dismissal cost remains significant in both 
regressions, whereas the other two indices are insignificant. Thus, the financial 
burden of dismissing redundant workers appears to be the most important 
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source of misallocation. This is consistent with theoretical results that confirm 
that dismissal cost has a strong effect on reallocation by reducing both job 
creation and job destruction (Lagos, 2006).  
The last two columns of the Table report the results for the regression 
model that includes an interaction term between dismissal cost and regulatory 
quality. The interaction term is insignificant in regression (3) and weakly 
significant in regression (4). Overall, there is no clear evidence that the effects 
of employment protection increase with law enforcement in our dataset20.   
iii) Alternative measures of misallocation  
In this subsection, I consider using the interquartile ranges of the logs of 
MPL and TFPR as alternative measures of dispersion. One potential problem 
of using the standard deviation is that it is sensitive to outlying observations, 
which are likely to be measured with error. The interquartile range has the 
advantage of not being affected by extreme values, although it could 
understate the extent of misallocation since it ignores the dispersion along the 
top and bottom quartiles of the distribution. 
The first result is presented in Table (3.A2) in the appendix, which is 
analogous to Table (3.3). Dismissal cost is positive and significant in both 
regressions, confirming the robustness of the results to alternative ways of 
measuring dispersions.  
                                                          
20 The results are unchanged when a more specific indicator measuring rule of law is 
used, again from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators database. When included 
directly, both dismissal cost and rule of law have positive coefficients, but their 
interaction terms are overall insignificant.  








Table (3.8) reports the sensitivity check for the interaction effects models. 
The first two regressions include an interaction term between dismissal cost 
and US layoff rate. The interaction term appears only weakly significant for 
MPL, and insignificant for TFPR. The interaction terms with layoff propensity 
thus do not appear robust when the interquartile range is used for measuring 
dispersion. This is potentially because the interquartile range fails to capture 
misallocation along the top and bottom quartiles.  
Table 3.8: Interaction effect regression results using the interquartile range 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IQR(MPL) IQR(TFPR) IQR(MPL) IQR(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost X Layoff rate 0.085* 0.078   
 (0.050) (0.054)   
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)2   0.145*** 0.197*** 
   (0.052) (0.057) 
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)    -0.058** -0.045*** 
   (0.022) (0.013) 
Sales growth2   -2.046 -5.074*** 
   (1.277) (1.426) 
Sales growth    1.173 1.575*** 
   (0.704) (0.458) 
Constant 1.603*** 1.670*** 1.187*** 1.345*** 
 (0.059) (0.056) (0.061) (0.122) 
     
Observations 731 501 370 236 
R-squared 0.437 0.333 0.547 0.428 
Notes: Regressions (1) & (2) are based on Equation (3.4) and regressions (3) & (4) are based 
on Equation (3.5). The dependent variables are within-industry interquartile ranges (IQR) of 
log-transformed values of MPL and TFPR. Country- and industry-effects and dummies 
showing year of data collection are included in all regressions. The standard errors given in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering by country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The interaction term with the square of sales growth, however, appears 
strongly significant in both regressions. The large positive coefficients confirm 
110  Chapter 3 
that the marginal effect of employment protection is much larger in industries 
with large positive and negative sales growth rates. At least for this measure of 
labor adjustment demand, the sensitivity test confirms that the results are 
robust to alternative ways of measuring misallocation that are less sensitive to 
outlying observations.  
iv) Estimation on a subset of countries 
Although the WBES is designed to be representative, around a quarter of 
the total observations are lost in the data cleaning process. To make sure that 
the results are not driven by data that is potentially unrepresentative, I 
conduct a robustness test by confining the analysis to a subset of countries 
with relatively high data coverage.  
For this purpose, I include only those countries in which the number of 
observations in the final dataset relative to the original dataset is at least 70 
percent (as opposed to the 40 percent requirement used so far). Since only few 
countries have sufficient coverage for TFPR, this sensitivity test is 
implemented only using MPL, for which data is more widely available. In this 
this subsample, the number of valid observations declines to 525 industries in 
60 countries (as opposed to 731 industries and 91 countries in the baseline 
regression). This significantly improves the average coverage to 85 percent 













Table 3.9: Regression results using a subset of countries with higher coverage  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SD(MPL) SD(MPL) SD(MPL) 
    
Dismissal cost  0.004***   
 (0.001)   
Dismissal cost X Layoff rate  0.114***  
  (0.031)  
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)2   0.058* 
   (0.030) 
Dismissal cost X (Sales growth)    -0.018** 
   (0.009) 
Sales growth2   -0.842 
   (0.695) 
Sales growth    0.436 
   (0.337) 
Trade openness 0.047   
 (0.086)   
Net FDI inflow -0.017*   
 (0.009)   
Registration procedures  0.007   
 (0.007)   
Private domestic credit -0.002***   
 (0.001)   
Regulatory quality 0.243***   
 (0.039)   
Constant 1.338*** 1.204*** 1.759*** 
 (0.176) (0.034) (0.048) 
    
Observations 525 525 230 
R-squared 0.411 0.662 0.742 
Notes: The regressions are, respectively, based on Equations (3.3), (3.4) & (3.5). The 
dependent variable is the within-industry standard deviation of the log of MPL. Country- 
and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data collection are included in all 
regressions. The standard errors given in parentheses are corrected for clustering by country. 
The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table (3.9) provides three regression results, all using the standard 
deviation of MPL. Dismissal cost has a significant positive effect on the 
standard deviation of MPL, with an equal coefficient as in the baseline result 
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of Table (3.3). The interaction term between dismissal cost and layoff rate also 
remains positive and significant. The interaction term of dismissal cost and the 
square of sales growth is positive and weakly significant. Compared to the 
baseline regression (3) of Table (3.4), the interaction term has a much larger 
coefficient. Overall, this test shows that the baseline regression results are not 
unduly driven by observations from countries with potentially low data 
quality.   
3.5.2   Instrumental variable estimation 
Regression analysis involving institutional variables is often subject to 
endogeneity problems because institutional design could be responsive to 
economic outcomes. One plausible source of endogeneity in our analysis is 
that trade unions might have more political clout in developing countries 
relative to business owners, leading to stringent employment protection in 
these countries. Since low income is likely to be associated with higher 
misallocation, our regression estimates could overstate the effect of 
employment protection. 
For sensitivity test, I conduct instrumental variable (IV) estimation by 
instrumenting employment protection with three historical variables. In an 
influential paper, Botero et al. (2004) argue that a country’s legal origin and the 
historical control of government power by leftist parties are important 
predictors of the level of employment protection in a country. They find that 
left power has a strong positive effect on employment protection and that civil 
law countries have significantly higher employment protection than common 
law countries.  








Our first two instrumental variables are thus a set of dummy variables 
showing legal origin, and a variable measuring the proportion of recent years 
during which leftist parties held government power. However, leftist 
governments are more likely to succeed in adopting pro-labor laws in 
authoritarian countries than in democratic countries with multi-party systems 
of government.  For this reason, I use a third instrumental variable that 
measures the level of electoral competitiveness in a country. The IV 
regressions are estimated using the three instruments as well as an interaction 
term of electoral competitiveness and left power to capture the likely non-
linear effect of left power on labor law legislation21. 
The use of these instruments is based on the assumption that they are 
historical variables and their introduction is not likely to have been motivated 
by economic factors. Previous studies have similarly used these variables to 
instrument employment protection among OECD economies (e.g. Bassanini et 
al., 2009). However, one potential source of endogeneity is that these 
instruments could also be predictors of other aggregate institutions which 
might be correlated with misallocation. While this can be a problem in the 
regressions where employment protection is directly included, it is less likely 
                                                          
21 Left power and electoral competitiveness are calculated using data for the years 1975-2000 
using data from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). Electoral 
competitiveness is calculated using average values of two related variables that measure the 
competitiveness of elections in the legislative and executive branches of government between 
one (no legislation and elections) and 7 (at least 25 percent seats taken are by opposition). 
The final indicator of electoral competitiveness is the average of the two variables. Botero et 
al. (2004) argue that the introduction of legal traditions is unlikely to correlate with economic 
performance since most countries inherited them through exogenous forces of conquest and 
colonization. 
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to cause concern when we apply IV on the difference-in-difference mode of 
Equation (3.4) by instrumenting the interaction between layoff rates and 
dismissal cost with the interaction between layoff rates and the instrumental 
variables. An important advantage of this approach is that it is possible to 
directly include country (and industry) dummies, thus accounting for 
aggregate confounding factors including unobserved institutional differences. 
This identification strategy allows us to capture the effect of predicted 
(instrumented) employment protection that varies across industries with 
different layoff propensities. The results from this analysis can be doubted 
only if the instruments pick the effect of another unobserved variable whose 
effect also varies across industries with different labor adjustment demand. It 
is, however, difficult to think of such variables that can be predicted by our 
instruments.  
The first stage regression of the IV estimation is reported in Table (3.A3) of 
the appendix. The interaction term between left power and electoral 
competitiveness is negative and significant, revealing that the effect of left 
power on employment protection declines with electoral competitiveness. 
However, countries with English legal origin appear to have higher dismissal 














Table 3.10: Instrumental variable regression results: main effect analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.009** 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Trade openness -0.011 0.011 0.017 0.017 
 (0.098) (0.093) (0.095) (0.081) 
Net FDI inflow -0.012* -0.015 -0.012* -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) 
Registration procedures  0.014 0.030* 0.015* 0.033** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) 
Private domestic credit -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulatory quality 0.244*** 0.205*** 0.269*** 0.213*** 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) 
Constant 1.334*** 1.192*** 1.250*** 1.138*** 
 (0.164) (0.257) (0.151) (0.219) 
     
Observations 91 61 90 60 
R-squared 0.585 0.587 0.551 0.587 
     
Chi2 overid. test: P-value   0.986 0.768 
Chi-sq  exogeneity test: P-
value 
  0.166 0.665 
     
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV 
Notes: All regressions are based on Equation (3.3). The standard deviations are calculated 
across the whole economy after MPL and TFPR are log-differenced from their industry 
averages. For example, SD(MPL) is calculated using log(MPLsi/MPLs) where MPLsi is firm-
level MPL and MPLs is its industry average.  The instruments in the IV regressions are left 
power, electoral competitiveness, the interaction term of the two, and legal origin dummies. 
Dummies showing year of data collection are included in all regressions. Analytic weights 
are used in all regressions, using the relevant country-level coverage rate as a weight. 
Estimation is based on 2-stage least square and robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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Table (3.10) reports the two-stage least squares IV estimates for Equation 
(3.3). For this specification, the regressions are estimated using a cross-country 
dataset since all of the variables in the first stage regression vary only across 
countries. The standard deviations are calculated across all firms within a 
country after MPL and TFPR are log-differenced from their industry averages 
in order to account for heterogeneity across industries.  
For comparison, the standard least square results using country-level data 
are reported in the first two columns of the Table. These regressions show that 
dismissal cost has positive and significant effect on the standard deviations of 
MPL and TFPR. The IV results are reported in the last two columns, along 
with results for overidentifying restrictions and exogeneity tests at the bottom 
rows. Importantly, the overidentifying restrictions tests do not reject the null 
hypotheses that the instruments are valid, confirming the instruments to be 
exogenous. The IV regressions also show that dismissal cost has significant 
positive effect on the standard deviations of both MPL and TFPR. Compared 
to the standard least square results, IV gives larger coefficients for dismissal 
cost, revealing that the baseline results are not biased upwards. If anything, 
the IV results suggest that that the baseline regressions might have 
understated the effect of employment protection. However, the standard 
errors for the coefficients of dismissal cost are also much larger in the IV 
regressions. This is in line with the results of the exogeneity tests that do not 
reject the exogeneity of dismissal cost, suggesting that OLS is a more efficient 
estimator. 
Next, I present the IV results for Equation (3.4), which includes an 
interaction term between dismissal cost and layoff propensity. Since layoff 
rates are taken from exogenous sources, they can be used as instruments for 








themselves. Unfortunately, sales growth is likely to be correlated with any 
potentially omitted variables that affect both misallocation and employment 
protection. Given the difficulty of getting instruments for sales growth, I 
conduct IV estimation only for the interaction effects model involving layoff 
propensity.  
Table 3.11: Instrumental variable regression results: interaction effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) SD(MPL) SD(TFPR) 
     
Dismissal cost X US layoff rate 0.233*** 0.149**   
 (0.083) (0.067)   
Dismissal cost X UK layoff rate   0.146** 0.049 
   (0.065) (0.052) 
Constant 1.124*** 1.224*** 1.151*** 1.287*** 
 (0.098) (0.075) (0.100) (0.077) 
     
Observations 722 494 722 494 
R-squared 0.598 0.484 0.591 0.475 
Chi2 overid. test: P-value 0.603 0.514 0.735 0.464 
Chi-sq  exogeneity test: P-value 0.089 0.661 0.067 0.813 
Notes: The regressions are based on Equation (3.4). The instrumental variables are the 
interaction terms between the respective layoff rate variable and the instrumental variables, 
namely left power, electoral competitiveness, the interaction term of the two, and legal origin 
dummies. Country- and industry-effects and dummies showing year of data collection are 
included in all regressions. Estimation is based on 2-stage least square and robust standard 
errors are given in parentheses. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table (3.11) reports the IV results using two alternative layoff rate 
measures from the US and UK. In these regressions, the interaction terms 
between dismissal cost and layoff rate are instrumented with the interaction of 
the respective layoff rate and the instrumental variables (i.e. legal origin 
dummies, left power, electoral competitiveness, and the interaction term of the 
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last two).  Although none of the instrumental variables vary across industries, 
their interaction terms with layoff rate vary across industries, allowing us to 
conduct regression analysis using country-industry data (for a similar IV 
application see Bassanini et al., 2009).  
The overidentifying restrictions tests at the bottom of Table (3.11) again do 
not reject the validity of the instruments. In addition, the exogeneity tests 
uphold that dismissal cost is exogenous. The IV results show that the 
interaction term between dismissal cost and US layoff rate is positive and 
significant. Compared to the baseline regression results in Table (3.4), the IV 
estimates of the coefficient are in general larger. The last two columns provide 
additional IV estimates using UK layoff rate data. The interaction term 
appears significant for the standard deviation of MPL, although it remains 
insignificant for TFPR. To sum up, results from IV estimation suggest that the 
baseline regression results are robust for potential endogeneity problems.  
3.6   Conclusion 
An emerging literature reveals that misallocation is an important determinant 
of aggregate productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 
2008; Bartelsman et al., 2013). Hence, understanding the sources of 
misallocation can give useful insights regarding the drivers of cross-country 
differences in productivity. However, there is little evidence on how 
institutional factors such as employment protection affect misallocation. 
Existing studies that analyze the effect of employment protection on aggregate 
productivity (Bassanini et al., 2009; Besley and Burgess, 2004) do not 
distinguish the separate effects of employment protection on misallocation 
since they rely on aggregate productivity data.  








This study investigates the effect of employment protection on 
misallocation of resources across manufacturing plants. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study to closely study the effects of employment protection on 
resource misallocation across heterogeneous plants. The advantage of looking 
into the effect of employment protection on misallocation is that there is a 
clear theoretical prediction that employment protection induces greater 
misallocation (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Lagos, 2006).  
Following the recent literature on misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009), 
I rely on the within-industry dispersions of the marginal product of labor and 
total factor productivity as measures of misallocation. Firm-level data from the 
WBES dataset that covers more than 90 countries is used for this purpose.  The 
results show that dismissal cost is associated with greater dispersion of the 
marginal product of labor and revenue productivity, indicating that it induces 
greater misallocation, thus reducing aggregate productivity and income. 
Further, the analysis shows that the effect of employment protection is 
larger in industries with greater labor adjustment demand. More specifically, 
employment protection has significantly larger effect in industries with 
inherently larger layoff rate and in expanding and shrinking industries in 
terms of sales growth. Since high layoff rate and sales expansion/shrinking 
imply greater labor adjustment demand, these results demonstrate that 
employment protection induces misallocation by constraining the adjustment 
of labor.  
A limitation of this study is that, due to the nature of the data it uses, it 
exclusively focuses on misallocation along the intensive margin. Previous 
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theoretical and empirical studies have shown that employment protection can 
also lower aggregate productivity by reducing the entry of new firms and by 
serving as an exit tax, thus keeping unproductive firms in operation 
(Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993). Assessing the effect of employment 
protection on misallocation due to entry and exit dynamics can add further 
insight beyond those documented here. 








3.A Appendix Tables 
Table 3.A1: Data coverage and other summary statistics by country 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












1 Afghanistan 2008 65 53 3,582 995 210 17.09 4.75 
2 Algeria 2002 257 61 3,936 2,120 3,112 1.26 0.68 
3 Angola 2006 195 92 4,742 2,688 1,857 2.55 1.45 
4 Argentina 2010 616 77 22,586 11,578 4,736 4.77 2.44 
5 Armenia 2009 51 45 4,259 1,201 1,598 2.66 0.75 
6 Azerbaijan 2009 80 67 3,325 1,424 1,578 2.11 0.90 
7 Bangladesh 2007 1,242 96 1,171 500 429 2.73 1.17 
8 Belarus 2008 49 47 7,263 2,340 3,090 2.35 0.76 
9 Belize 2010 50 69 20,351 7,299 3,821 5.33 1.91 
10 Benin 2004 127 87 3,155 972 562 5.62 1.73 
11 Botswana 2006 81 71 4,441 1,866 5,468 0.81 0.34 
12 Brazil 2003 1,476 90 4,826 2,480 4,743 1.02 0.52 
13 Bulgaria 2007 562 88 7,990 2,519 3,733 2.14 0.67 
14 Burkina Faso 2009 59 62 7,896 1,040 385 20.52 2.70 
15 Burundi 2006 93 91 1,513 583 154 9.82 3.79 
16 Chile 2010 604 77 23,110 9,686 7,631 3.03 1.27 
17 China 2003 1,290 80 14,353 1,330 1,731 8.29 0.77 
18 Colombia 2010 598 84 13,855 6,228 3,404 4.07 1.83 
19 Congo, DR 2006 134 90 1,878 832 125 14.99 6.64 
20 Costa Rica 2005 252 73 9,866 6,855 4,633 2.13 1.48 
21 Cote d'Ivoire 2009 158 76 2,686 995 908 2.96 1.10 
22 Croatia 2007 343 83 30,572 11,547 10,090 3.03 1.14 
23 Dominican 
Rep. 
2010 83 68 10,093 4,086 3,670 2.75 1.11 
24 Ecuador 2006 291 74 12,403 3,833 2,751 4.51 1.39 
25 Egypt 2004 776 79 1,424 640 1,209 1.18 0.53 
26 El Salvador 2003 414 89 3,980 2,870 2,825 1.41 1.02 
27 Eritrea 2009 42 45 4,906 504 245 20.04 2.06 
28 Estonia 2009 54 59 30,271 12,785 10,330 2.93 1.24 
29 Ethiopia 2002 199 47 940 500 165 5.68 3.02 
30 Georgia 2008 50 41 3,104 1,297 1,470 2.11 0.88 
31 Ghana 2007 284 97 1,138 610 496 2.29 1.23 
32 Guatemala 2003 364 84 3,896 2,699 2,140 1.82 1.26 
33 Guinea 2006 124 92 820 331 325 2.53 1.02 
34 Guyana 2004 144 88 4,150 2,082 1,105 3.75 1.88 
35 Honduras 2003 371 82 2,561 1,965 1,412 1.81 1.39 
36 Hungary 2009 68 59 22,745 7,688 10,937 2.08 0.70 
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37 India 2002 1,609 88 3,477 865 732 4.75 1.18 
38 Indonesia 2009 802 68 1,806 857 1,258 1.44 0.68 
39 Iraq 2011 422 89 12,229 3,885 1,135 10.78 3.42 
40 Ireland 2005 119 68 75,334 31,095 48,866 1.53 0.64 
41 Jamaica 2010 91 75 11,201 4,915 4,179 2.68 1.18 
42 Kazakhstan 2009 121 66 5,462 2,470 3,771 1.45 0.66 
43 Kenya 2007 381 96 8,770 2,211 526 16.67 4.20 
44 Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2003 85 83 772 394 476 1.62 0.83 
45 Lao PDR 2009 98 67 1,856 873 475 3.90 1.84 
46 Latvia 2009 64 70 16,200 6,583 6,973 2.32 0.94 
47 Lithuania 2009 51 50 15,312 6,580 7,604 2.01 0.87 
48 Macedonia, 
FYR 
2009 67 53 7,520 3,349 2,937 2.56 1.14 
49 Madagascar 2009 141 69 2,093 767 282 7.43 2.72 
50 Malawi 2005 124 79 2,600 590 215 12.10 2.75 
51 Malaysia 2002 632 70 14,308 4,311 5,499 2.60 0.78 
52 Mali 2007 279 93 1,790 898 403 4.45 2.23 
53 Mauritania 2006 61 76 2,426 1,601 717 3.38 2.23 
54 Mauritius 2009 180 83 7,372 2,501 5,054 1.46 0.49 
55 Mexico 2010 1,002 86 13,190 5,345 7,973 1.65 0.67 
56 Moldova 2003 93 90 1,330 661 831 1.60 0.80 
57 Mongolia 2009 104 80 2,041 1,045 991 2.06 1.05 
58 Morocco 2004 724 86 4,935 3,313 1,931 2.56 1.72 
59 Mozambique 2007 304 90 1,676 836 317 5.29 2.64 
60 Namibia 2006 76 72 12,128 3,531 3,491 3.47 1.01 
61 Nepal 2009 95 69 1,486 774 298 4.99 2.60 
62 Nicaragua 2003 400 88 1,853 1,307 1,166 1.59 1.12 
63 Nigeria 2007 920 97 2,472 973 803 3.08 1.21 
64 Pakistan 2002 707 81 3,238 936 691 4.69 1.35 
65 Panama 2006 152 63 12,652 4,231 4,776 2.65 0.89 
66 Paraguay 2010 86 51 12,642 4,309 1,267 9.98 3.40 
67 Peru 2010 586 77 14,145 4,869 2,881 4.91 1.69 
68 Philippines 2009 697 71 6,269 1,525 1,205 5.20 1.27 
69 Poland 2009 58 42 20,328 6,644 7,963 2.55 0.83 
70 Romania 2009 78 41 7,010 3,486 4,572 1.53 0.76 
71 Russia 2009 358 51 12,748 4,771 5,337 2.39 0.89 
72 Rwanda 2006 46 78 1,797 966 281 6.40 3.44 
73 Senegal 2007 247 95 2,782 1,502 800 3.48 1.88 
74 Serbia 2009 92 68 14,598 5,449 3,391 4.30 1.61 
75 Slovenia 2009 69 66 49,813 23,118 17,855 2.79 1.29 
76 South Africa 2007 647 95 16,768 7,747 5,234 3.20 1.48 
77 Spain 2005 106 79 54,531 22,873 26,056 2.09 0.88 
          








  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












78 Sri Lanka 2004 324 72 1,267 624 1,242 1.02 0.50 
79 St. Lucia 2010 48 76 11,306 6,944 5,529 2.04 1.26 
80 Suriname 2010 65 87 13,009 8,928 3,593 3.62 2.48 
81 Swaziland 2006 58 83 6,720 1,954 2,540 2.65 0.77 
82 Tajikistan 2003 89 93 802 343 358 2.24 0.96 
83 Tanzania 2006 246 90 2,883 845 375 7.69 2.25 
84 Thailand 2004 1,309 95 5,857 1,795 2,644 2.22 0.68 
85 Trinidad & 
Tobago 
2010 83 71 16,992 8,567 12,231 1.39 0.70 
86 Turkey 2008 523 58 30,581 7,683 7,088 4.31 1.08 
87 Uganda 2006 278 91 1,542 838 325 4.75 2.58 
88 Uruguay 2010 210 55 19,883 7,992 5,252 3.79 1.52 
89 Vietnam 2005 1,088 95 1,608 811 642 2.50 1.26 
90 Zambia 2007 289 95 3,826 1,517 626 6.11 2.42 
91 Zimbabwe 2011 359 95 . . 458 . . 
          
 Minimum  42 41 772 331 125 0.81 0.34 
 Maximum  1,609 97 75,334 31,095 48,866 20.52 6.64 
 Median  158 77 4,921 2,101 1,731 2.74 1.22 
 Mean  325 76 9,737 3,920 3,705 4.27 1.55 
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Table 3.A2: The effect of dismissal cost on alternative measures of 
misallocation 
 (1) (2) 
 IQR(MPL) IQR(TFPR) 
   
Dismissal cost 0.002** 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Trade openness -0.083 -0.125 
 (0.079) (0.080) 
Net FDI inflow -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Registration procedures  0.006 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.015) 
Domestic sector credit  -0.003*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulatory quality 0.188*** 0.105* 
 (0.046) (0.053) 
Constant 1.479*** 1.569*** 
 (0.192) (0.236) 
   
Observations 731 501 
R-squared 0.211 0.149 
Notes: The regressions are based on Equation (3.3). The dependent variables are the within-
industry interquartile ranges (IQR) of log-transformed values of MPL and TFPR. Industry- 
and country- effects and dummies showing year of data collection are included in all 
regressions. The standard errors are given in parentheses are corrected for clustering by 
country. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  








Table 3.A3: First stage regression results for the indicators of employment 
protection 
 (1) 
 Dismissal cost 
  




Left Power  0.401*** 
 (0.132) 
Electoral competitiveness 4.103* 
 (2.080) 
English legal origin 11.067** 
 (4.439) 
French legal origin 5.692 
 (3.482) 
Trade openness -0.034 
 (0.040) 
Net FDI inflow -0.453* 
 (0.272) 
Registration procedures  0.096 
 (0.522) 
Private domestic credit 0.019 
 (0.069) 







Notes: Data for left power and electoral competitiveness, is taken from the Database of 
Political Institutions compiled by Beck et al. (2001), and are based on the years 1975-2000. 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The asterisks indicate the usual levels of 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.B   Measuring Employment Protection 
The dismissal and hiring procedures indices are calculated using country-level 
data from the ‘Employing Workers’ project of the Doing Business Indicators 
program conducted by the World Bank. The methodology used for calculating 
the indices follows closely the official methodology of calculating employment 
protection indicators22. Separate indices are calculated for the years 2010 and 
2011 which are the only years for which detailed data is available. The final 
analysis is conducted using the average value of the indices over the two 
years.  
Dismissal procedures index: Higher values of this index indicate heavier 
regulatory burden for dismissing redundant workers. The index is calculated 
using responses for the following eight questions. (1) Is it legal for an 
employer to terminate the employment contract of a worker on the basis of 
redundancy? (2) Must the employer notify a third party before dismissing one 
redundant worker? (3) Does the employer need the approval of a third party 
in order to dismiss one redundant worker? (4) Must the employer notify or 
consult a third party prior to a collective dismissal (at least 9 employees)? (5) 
Must the employer obtain prior approval from a third party before a collective 
dismissal (at least 9 employees)? (6) Is there a re-training or re-assignment 
obligation before an employer can make a worker redundant? (7) Are there 
priority rules that apply to redundancy dismissals or layoffs? (8) Are there 
priority rules applying to re-employment?  
                                                          
22 http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/employing-workers 








The responses for these questions are coded as follows. If the response for 
question 1 is no, dismissal due to redundancy is illegal implying the highest 
level of dismissal restriction. In this special case the final dismissal procedures 
index is assigned the maximum possible value of 10 and all the other questions 
are not used. For every other question except question (4), if the answer is yes, 
a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is given. An answer of yes to 
question (4) is given a score of 2, thus giving a greater weight for this response. 
The final index is calculated as the sum of responses for questions (2)-(8) 
except for the case where the response of question 1 is no (in which case it 
takes a value of 10). 
Hiring procedures index: Higher values of this index indicate heavier 
burden of employment regulation. The index is calculated using responses for 
the following five questions. (1) Are fixed-term contracts prohibited for 
permanent tasks? (2) What is the maximum allowed cumulative duration of a 
fixed-term employment contracts (in months), including all renewals? (3) Can 
the workweek for a single worker extend to 50 hours per week (including 
overtime) for 2 months each year to respond to a seasonal increase in 
production? (4) Are there restrictions on night work? (5) Are there restrictions 
on "weekly holiday" work?  
A response of yes for question (1) is assigned a value of 1, whereas a 
response of no is assigned 0. For question (2) a score of 1 is assigned if the 
maximum cumulative duration of ﬁxed term contracts is less than 3 years; 0.5 
if it is 3 years or more but less than 5 years; and 0 if ﬁxed-term contracts can 
last 5 years or more. For questions (3)-(5) a response of yes is assigned a score 
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of 0, whereas a score of 1 is assigned if the answer is no. The final hiring 
procedures index is calculated as the average of the five variables.  
  
